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DISCRETION, POLICY AND SECTION 19 (1) (a)
OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT
P. Harris Auerbach*
"When law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise
of discretion may mean either beneficience or
tyranny, either justice or injustice, either
1

reasonableness or unreasonableness."

This paper has as its background the conflict between the interest of
administrative agencies in developing policies which streamline decision-making processes and the interest of the individual in obtaining
decisions which take account of the special features of his or her
claim.2 Its focus, however, will be on a specific example of how policy
can harden into rules which effectively fetter the discretion of the decision-makers. The example selected is the examination of assessment of
applicants for permanent residence under the Immigration Act, S.C.
1976, c-52. This function is performed by the Department of National
Health and Welfare's Medical Services Branch (MSB) and the medical
practictioners designated by the MSB to carry out examinations and to
form binding opinions regarding admissibility. It will be argued that
the MSB and its delegates have been granted considerable discretion
to be used in determining who is and who is not admissible under the
ImmigrationAct; that this discretion is often fettered by the adoption of
policies; and that this results in the achievement of consistency and
efficiency at the expense of adherence to the principle that "discretion
*
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1. Philip Anizman, ed., "A Catalogue of Discretionary Powers in the Revised
Statutes of Canada 1970," (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1975). preface.
2. DJ. Galligan, "The Nature and Function of Policies within Discretionary
Power" [19761 P.L. 332.
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be brought to bear on every case".3 In this connection, it will be
argued that it is generally possible to accomodate both the interests of
decision-makers in having policies which may determine the result of
individual cases and the individual's interest in having discretion be
more than just notionally available. Lastly, it will be urged that specific steps be taken to ensure that this possibility is realized in the
assessment of applicants for permanent residence under the Immigration Act. Before any of these propositions will be considered, however,
some preliminary remarks concerning the nature of administrative discretion are in order.
The concept of legal discretion has been described as one implying the
power to make a choice between alternatives where there is "room for
reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which one is to be
preferred".4 The observation "where law ends, discretion begins" has
led to some confusion surrounding the exercise of "absolute",
"unfettered" or "untrammelled" discretion.5 In fact, while there exists
three broad classes or types of discretion which administrative agencies avail themselves of in the exercise of their delegated powers, none
of them can properly be said to be "unfettered". 6 Nonetheless, it has
been contended that in spite of the theoretical checks on discretionmost of which centre on notions such as the "rule of law", "natural
justice" or the "duty to be fair"-its exercise in practice may be absolute and unfettered. The notion of unlimited discretion, however, has
been clearly rejected, 7 and the courts have frequently asserted their
right to review exercises of discretion for a wide range of abuses. Statutory delegates have been held to have been acting outside of their

3. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1982) at 330331.
4. Secretary of State for Education and Science v. ThornesideMetropolitan Borough
Council 119771 A.C. 1014, at 1064 per Lord Diplock.
5. J.M. Bublman, "The Supervisory Role of the Courts: An Historical Perspective," The Charter of Rights and Administrative Law, (Toronto: Law Society of
Upper Canada, 1983-1984 at 31.
6. Ibid. at 30. See also: Jones De Villars, Principles of Administrative Law
(Toronto, Carswell, 1985) at 118.
7. Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959! S.C.R. 122 at 140 and 167.
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jurisdiction 8 where the use of power has been for an unauthorized or
ulterior purpose,9 in bad faith,10 or was based on either irrelevant considerations I or inadequate material. 12 As well, the courts have looked
to the effects of the exercise of discretion to determine whether an
13
abuse has occurred. In this way, decisions which are unreasonable
or discriminatory have been quashed or set aside.
If the essence of discretion is as we have described it, admitting of
being exercised differently in different cases, then its existence must
imply the absence of a rule dictating the result in each case. As H.W.
R. Wade puts it:
"It is a fundamental rule for the exercise of discretionary power
that discretion must be brought to bear on every case; each one
must be considered on its own
merits and decided as the public
14
interest requires at the time."

8. Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [19691 A.C. 147 at 171 (H.L).
Lord Reid makes clear that an abuse of discretion is an error which is jurisdictional in nature, even though the delegate has complied with all the mandatory
requirements, is dealing with the subject matter granted to him by the legislation, and has the right to exercise the discretionary power in question.
9. Roberts v. Hopwood, 119251 A.C. 578 (H.L.), which involved the payment of a
municipal council of higher wages than necessary in order to be a "model
employer" even though council was entitled to pay "such wages as [council]
may think fit."
10. Supra, note 7 at 140.
11. Smith v. Rhuland v. R.; Ex rel. Andrews, 119531 2 S.C.R. 95, where a Labour
Relations Board rejected an application for certification of a union as a bargaining unit on the basis that the secretary treasurer of the union was a
communist.
12. See D.W. Elliot, "No Evidence-A Ground for Judicial Review in Canada?"
(1972-73) 37 Sask. L.R. 48.
13. Supra, note 7 at 132, where it is noted that unreasonableness can, in some
circumstances, be treated as a synonymn for the exercise of a discretion for
an improper purpose, in bad faith, or on irrelevant considerations. All the
same, it is possible that a delegate can act in the best faith, ignore irrelevant
considerations and still produce a result which a court might characterize as
being unreasonable. See also Roberts v. Hopwood (supra, note 9).
14. Supra, note 7 at 137.
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This observation describes the principle in which the abuse of fettering of discretion is rooted. Because delegated powers are usually exercised by the persons to whom they have been granted, there needs to
be a limit on the degree to which such persons can fetter that discretion by the introduction of policy or regulations which pre-determine
the result in individual cases. The adoption of inflexible policies
which require a delegate to exercise his or her discretion in particular
ways may "illegally limit the ambit of his (or her) power". 15 The abuse
of fettering of discretion is therefore a jurisdictional one and judicial
review provides for the possibility,
at least in principle, that an order
16
for mandamus may be obtained.
This is not to suggest that delegates cannot adopt general policies to
guide their decision-making. On the contrary, it is understood as both
inevitable and necessary that administrative bodies faced with large
numbers of discretionary decisions all but have to use such guidelines. The requirement remains, however, that policies and guidelines
must not fetter the discretion of decision-makers by resulting in the
wholesale determination of individual cases other than on their own
17
merits.
It has been persuasively argued elsewhere that discretion entails a
power in the decision-maker to make policy choices and to develop
guidelines (to achieve legitimate ends) which determine particular
decisions.18 While it is often the case that this is the practical role of
policy within discretion, there is still a wide distinction to be drawn
15. Contrast "intra-jurisdictional" abuses, such as the abuse of misconstruing the
law, which may be insulated from judicial review by the use of privative
clauses. An example of this is found in Section 108 of the Alberta Municipal
Government Act (R.SA 1980, cm-26) which reads as follows:
"108. A by-law or resolution passed by a council in the exercise of
any of the powers conferred and in accordance with this Act,
and in good faith, is not open to question nor shall it be
quashed, set aside or declared invalid, either wholly or partly,
on account of the unreasonableness or supposed unreasonableness of its provisions or any of them."
16. R. v. Port of London Authority: Ex parte Kynoch, Ltd., [1919] 1 K.B. 176 at 184
(C.A.) per Bankes LJ., and Sagnata Investments v. Norwich Corporation, [1971]
2 Q.B. 614.
17. Sagnata, ibid. at 625.
18. Supra, note 2 at 332.
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between the two ways in which this can be true. As19Bankes U. said in
R v. Port of London Authority. ex parte Kynoch, Ltd:
'There are on the one had cases where a tribunal in the honest
exercise of its discretion has adopted a policy, and without refusing
to hear an applicant, intimates to him what its policy is, and that
after hearing him it will in accordance with its policy decide
against him, unless there is something exceptional in his case... (I)f
the policy has been adopted for reasons which the tribunal may
legitimately entertain, no objection could be taken to such a course.
On the other hand, there were cases where a tribunal has passed a
rule, or come to a determination, not to hear any application of a
particular character by whomsoever made."
While the line that demarcates the acceptable role of policy from the
unacceptable may be a conceptually clear one, in practice it is often
difficult to determine whether it has been crossed. This is so for a
variety of reasons, one of which is the relative ease with which
"reasons" for decisions may be couched in terms which disguise the
fact of busy officials simply referring to policy guidelines. In some
cases, however, it is possible to show that a decision-maker is extrapolating either expressly or impliedly, from past decisions; or, worse
still, is simply invoking a "rule of thumb". Yet even where the policy
is expressed or implied in manuals, the difficult task remains of
showing that the policy has been invoked at the expense of judicial
analysis of the merits of the individual case. Before examining the
way in which this may happen to an applicant for permanent residence in Canada who is found to be medically inadmissible, it is necessary to outline the process involved and to fix the location and
scope of discretion in that process.
Section 11 of the ImmigrationAct 20 provides as follows:
11. (1) "Every immigrant and every visitor of a prescribed class
shall undergo a medical examination by a medical officer.2 1
Section 19 of the Immigration Act states in part:
19. (1) "No person shall be granted admission if he is a member
of any of the following classes:

19. Supra, note 16 at 625.
20. S.C. 1976, C-52.
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Persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or other health impairment as a result
of the nature, severity or probable duration of which,
in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by
at lease one other medical officer, (i) they are likely
to be a danger to public health or to public safety;
or(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on
health and social services;
(b) Persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe
are or will be unable or unwilling to support themselves, those persons who are dependent on them for
care and support, except those persons who have satisfied an immigration officer that adequate arrangements have been made for their care and support."
Chapter 8 of the Immigration manual 2 2 indicates that although the
authority to conduct medical examinations and assessments is contained in sections of the Immigration Act and Regulations,
"responsibility" for the policies, guidelines and procedures "rest primarily with Health and Welfare Canada."23 The Department of National
Health and Welfare Act24 states in part that the duties, powers and functions of the Minister include "the inspection and medical care of
immigrants." "Medical Services" is a branch of the Department of
National Health and Welfare and among its numerous functions is the
Immigration Medical Activity. In turn, this activity includes, but is not
limited to, the medical examination of applicants under the Immigration Act and the determination of their admissibility under s. 19(1) of
the Act.
Examinations and assessments of applicants-usually overseas but in
some circumstances within Canada-are conducted by medical practitioners who are recognized by order of the Minister of National
Health and Welfare as medical officers for the purposes of the Immi(a)

21. "Medical Officer" is defined in s. 2(1) of the Immigration Act as meaning a
"qualified medical practitioner authorized or recognized by order of the Minister of National Health and Welfare as a medical officer for the purposes of this
Act."

22. Immigration Manual, Employment and Immigration Canada, IS 8, (Selection and Control)
23. Ibid. at c. 8.02.

24. Department of National Health and Welfare Act, S.C. 1976.
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gration Act. 2 5 The legal imperative for the medical officer is to identify
"inadmissible persons" according to the two principle criteria in section 19(1); namely, danger to public health or safety (19(1)(aXi)) and
actual or potential demand on health and social services (19(lXa)(ii)).
As well, in assessing admissibility, the medical officer must use three
supporting criteria described in section 22 of the Regulations to the
Immigration Act. These are: (1) the probable response to treatment of
any condition that might exist; (2) the need for surveillance; and (3)

the potential employability or productivity of the applicant within
Canada.
In order to give a medical opinion to Employment and Immigration
officials in terms which are easily understood, a system of assessment
has been developed whereby an applicannt is assigned a medical profile. This medical profile consists of a coded series of letters and numbers based on the two principle criteria and the three supporting
criteria mentioned above. Under each criterion is a list of descriptive
categories, numbered from one to seven or eight Taken as a whole,
the ratings assigned under each criterion form the basis for a legally
binding medical opinion regarding admissibility.24 This opinion is
expressed by the symbol "M" at the end of the profile and represents
the combined significance of the five criteria. The M statement indicates that in the opinion of a medical officer an applicant
is either
26
admissible, conditionally admissible or inadmissible.
Three things need to be determined at this point First, where the
opinion of the medical officer is that the applicant is inadmissible, a
second opinion is required by the Immigration AcL27 Second, whether
or not S. 19(l)(b) applies ("unwilling or unable to support themselves')

25. Supra, note 20, s. 2(1).
26. Medical Officers Handbook, Immigation Medical Services (Ottawa: Health
and Welfare Canada) s. III at 2. The applicant's status is shown in the profile in the following format:
HDTSEM
Where, briefly, H stands for risk to public health and safety, D for demand on
health and social services, T for expected response to treatment, S for requirement of surveillance, E for employability and productivity, and M for medical

status-the result of the other factors combined.
27. Supra, note 20 at s. 19(1)(a).
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is decided by an immigration officer, based on his/her knowledge of
civil factors as well as information provided by the medical officer.
Third, by contrast, when the medical officer forms an opinion about
the admissibility of an applicant purely on medical grounds using section 19(1)(a) of the Act, his/her medical judgment is legally binding so
long as the visa officer is "satisfied", pursuant to s. 9(4) of the Act, that
the applicant is a person described in s. 19(1).28.
Thus there is a grant of broad discretion to medical officers to determine which applicants, if admitted to Canada, would cause, or might
reasonably be expected to cause, excessive demands on health and
social services. Nowhere in the Immigration Act or Regulations is the
word "excessive" defined, although there is a list of factors to be considered by the medical officer in arriving at this determination.29
Among these is whether the supply of health or social services that the
person may require in Canada is so limited that the use by the applicant might prevent or delay provision of those services to Canadian
citizens or permanent residents. Nevertheless, if the nature of discretion is that there is no uniquely right answer, that there is a power to
make a choice between alternatives, then medical officers making
determinations regarding "excessive demands on health and social
services" have certainly been delegated discretion. This is especially
clear when one considers that medical officers can and do find against
admissibility based on the probability of excess demands being made
"might reasonably be
in the future-thereby making use of the words
30
expected to cause" included in s. 19(lXa)(ii).
The scope of the discretion granted to medical officers is restricted to
s. 22 of the Regulations which dictates that certain factors "shall" be
taken into account. These include any other reports made by a medi-

28. Supra, note 26 at 3. Where, in the opinion of the Minister of Employment and
Immigration, special circumstances exist, an applicant may be admitted under a
Minister's permit pursuant to s. 37 of the Act despite a finding by medical officers against admissibility. Also, visa or immigration officers are subject to the
duty not to issue a refusal on medical grounds based on a medical notification
which contains an "impropriety", Patter v. MEJ, [1987] 2 Imm. LJ. (2d) 1.
29. Regulations to the Immigration Act, s. 22.
30. Ahir v. Canada (M.E.I.), [19841 1. F.C. 1098, 163 N.R. 185 (F.C.A.) and Hiramen v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1986), 65. N.R. (F.C.A.).
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cal practitioner, the communicability of the disease or disorder;, any
requirement of surveillance; the supply of required services for Canadians and permanent residents; the need for hospitalization; and
whether the potential immigrant's employability or productivity is
affected. Substance is added to these considerations in the form of the
medical officer's handbook, which is distributed to medical officers by
the MSB. The stated purpose of the manual is to "provide guidance"
to medical officers in the medical categorization of applicants under
the Immigration Act. The guidelines it contains, however, include what
may amount to "policies" concerning the categorization of certain disabilities or diseases. Its preface states that the guidelines it contains
are "confidently expected" to produce "the desired results. '31 Considering the volume of medical examinations it can be fairly assumed
that among these unstated goals is that of efficient and consistant categorization of applicants.
There are numerous ways in which the discretion of medical officers is
effectively fettered in the determination of admissibility under s.
19(l)(a)(ii), as a result of following the manual's guidelines. The first
occurs when, once having made a diagnosis of a disease or disorder,
the medical officer recurs to section IV of the manual where specific
diseases are reviewed in relation to the criteria. There the medical officer will find explanations of how certain conditions "should be
categorized" so that "logic and consistency" are maintained. 32 The
danger that these guidelines may sometimes harden into rules is a very
real one.
Indeed, there is considerable support in the case law to sustain the
proposition that medical offices are using the manual's suggested categorizations in substitution for their own judgment on the admissibility
of applicants. In Le v Canada,3 3 for example, the Immigration Appeal
Board heard an appeal from the refusal of a sponsored application for
landing under s. 19(l)(a)(ii). Mediical officers had made a diagnosis of
deafness, mutism and borderline intelligence. While counsel for the
appellant, Barbara Jackman, attacked the reasonableness of the opin-

31. Supra, note 67.
32. Supra, note 27, Section IV at 2.
33. Le v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1986! 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) at 56.
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ion formed as bad in law, the case is also instructive for the obvious
failure of the medical officers to really turn their minds to the questions which they were required to consider. More than anything, it
appears that once the diagnosis was made, the categorization flowed
not from further investigation or serious consideration of the criteria
(response to treatment, future productivity, etc) but rather from the
classification suggested. The medical opinion in this case was formed
by an officer in Singapore and it is noteworthy that just before the
medical notification was completed, the doctor in Singapore had
advised the overseas medical officer in Bangkok by telex that "deaf
mutism is no longer enough to warrant M7." 34 (M7 is the code for
"Has a condition which would cause excessive demand on health or
social services, and which is not likely to respond to treatment: Inadmissible as Section 19 (1Xa)(ii) applies.)" 35 The telex to Bangkok goes
on to say, however, that "where deaf mutism is accompanied by
bor' 36
derline mental retardation" the sufferer "is to be assessed as M7.
The Immigration Appeal Board has this to say about the opinion of
the medical officers:
"Their conclusion that Ngoc Thao (the dependent son of the sponsored applicant) was unemployable or unproductive was in flat
contradiction (to) the material upon which they must be taken to
have acted. Their conclusion that he would place an excessive
demand on social services cannot be sustained ... There is no evidence whatever that the government medical officers ever turned
their attention to the social services Ngoc Thao might require....
We can only conclude that no evidence as to the demand on relevant social services was sought or relied upon
37 by (the medical officer in Singapore) in arriving at his opinion.
The letter of refusal received by the family began, ironically enough,
with the words "we have carefully and sympathetically assessed your
application under the Immigration Act and the Regulations...,38 With
regard to the telex, the Board's opinion was that it "unhappily shows

34. Supra, note 34 at 58.
35. Supra, note 27, Section III at 20.
36. Supra, note 33 at 58.

37. Ibid. at 65.
38. Ibid. at 56.
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that the originating office, Singapore, where (the medical officer) was
stationed, operates in such a way as to fetter the full authority given by
paragraph3919 (1)(a) of the Act to medical officers to form (reasonable)
opinions."
Again, this case was argued on the grounds of unreasonableness.
There is every reason to believe that those applicants under the Immigration Act who have right of appeal to the board (Canadian citizens
and permanent residents) will pursue remedies there or in the Federal
Court of Canada along similar lines. Nevertheless, the availability of a
particular remedy such as unreasonableness or acting on inadequate
material (discussed above) should not obscure the fact of the larger
scale abuse; the fettering of discretion by the adoption of inflexible
policies. In the Le case there was a policy regarding deaf mutism in
combination with borderline mental retardation and the discretion of
the medical officers was decidedly fettered by aderence to that policy.4 The consequences of this kind of fettering are especially severe
in the case of independant applicants under the Immigration Act. In
such cases, where there is no permanent reident or Canadian citizen
sponsoring the applicatioon, no right of appeal exists, and neither is
there any statutory requirement for MSB to review either the application or the medical notification. There is every reason to believe that
abuses similar to those found in the Le case occur regularly overseas
and, absent a right to review or appeal, findings of inadmissibility
rooted in policy rather than on the merits will escape censure of any
kind.
The medical officers' handbook contains numerous other illustrations
of what may well be inflexible policies in the hands of medical officers. For example, the manual suggests that persons who suffer from
Down's Syndrome "will, with rare exceptions, be categorized as M7";
that they are "expected to be unable to support themselves"; and that
"the likelihood of medical and neurologic complications in addition to
the mental sub-normality is also high and bears upon the matter of
future demands upon health services."4 1 While this is not a statement
of policy that once a diagnosis of Down's Syndrome is made, inadmis-

39. Ibid. at 67.
40. See also: Mohammed v. Canada (M.E.I.), [19871 2 Imm. L.R. (2d) at 231.
41. Supra, note 27 at 40.
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sibility follows, it is nevertheless precisely the sort of "guideline" which
fetters the discretion of decision-makers. It does this in two ways: first,
it suggests the answers to questions which the medical officer is dutybound to entertain. For example, the question regarding expected
demand on health and social services (the "D" category in the medical
profile) is one in relation to "resources." 4 2 Even a cursory glance at the
handbook makes clear that this is a complex and difficult question,
and therefore one likely to be answered in a way suggested by the
guidelines rather than based on any kind of committed investigation
or inquiry into the facts of the individual case. In section HI of the
manual, (Assessing System and Method), the following passage
appears after description of the considerations relevant to a "D" categorization:
"9.

It follows then that it is not possible at present to establish
quantitative guidelines based on statistical analysis of
Canadian Health and Social Care experience in order to
differentiate the Dland D8 categories of the profile.

They are worded, however, in such a way that the Medical
Officer from his general professional experience, supplemented by such information as may be provided from
time to time by Medical Services Branch, 43will be able to
make a reasonably valid D catogorzation."
To arrive at a reasonable judgment as to whether or not any demand
on services should be considered "excessive" is the task assigned to the
medical officer. The handbook, however, prejudges this question and
fetters the discretion of medical officers by suggesting the conclusion
where a diagnosis of Down's Syndrome has been made: M7.
(a)

The second way in which the handbook serves to fetter the discretion
of medical officers concerns the requirement that the initial medical
opinion be concurred in by at least one other medical officer. Judging
from many of the cases before the Immigration Appeal Board, one
must seriously question whether any kind of review is done at all by
the second, concurring medical officer.4 4 In short, there is no reason to
think that a diagnosis of Down's Syndrome, along with a notification

42. Supra, note 27.
43. Supra, note 26.
44. Garcha v. Canada (M.E.I), [19871 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) at 92 (Editor's Note).
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concluding "MT" would be reviewed with any vigor at all by the secand medical officer. This process is what results in "the self-created
rule of policy";46 one which, in the case of Down's Syndrome, results
in a flat refusal to consider the (admittedly difficult) questions concerning expected demand on health and social services, employability,
and response to treatment
It was suggested at the outset that it is generally possible to accomodate both the interests of decision-makers in developing policies which
may determine the outcome of individual cases, and the interest of
individuals in having a legitimate opportunity to have discretionary
power exercised if the circumstances of their case warrant it.
It was
also suggested that special steps could be taken to ensure this result in
the context of the Immigration Medical Activity. It is hoped that in
developing proposals relating specifically to the Immigration Medical
Activity, the more general proposition regarding the relationship
between policy and discretion can be illustrated.
In regard to policies, the risk that has been demonstrated is that the
requirement of considering each case to determine if an exception
should be made can be reduced to a mere formality. What is particularly problematic in the area of medical categorizations is the absence
of any meaningful participation on the part of interested parties. Such
participation is essential is some consideration of the merits of each
case is to be guaranteed.
At present, while the visa officer who issues a refusal on medical
grounds is under a duty to provide all of the particulars and reasons
for the refusal,4 6 there is no duty to inform an applicant of an
unfavourable diagnosis prior to the disposition of the application, and
neither is there a duty to relate the refusal to the relevant criteria. In
Bal v. Canada,4 7 the Immigration Appeal Board found that the applicant had been treated unfairly because such a failure to inform (prior
to disposition) denied him the opportunity to have a diagnostic liver
biopsy. Such a procedure could have provided the means to rebut the
grounds for inadmissibility. Yet the Board did-not go further, to hold

45. J.Molot, "The Self-created Rule of Policy" 18:3 McGill U. at 310.
46. Sidhu v. M.E.L, [1987! Imm. L.R. (2d) at 229.
47. Bal v.Canada (M.E.I), [19881 6 Imm. L.R. (2d).
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that the general duty of fairness discussed in the Nicholson casem created a specific duty to inform prior to disposition of the case. Clearly,
if the merits of individual cases are to be "required reading" for medical officers, then an opportunity to rebut the medical officer's diagno-.
sis is essential. Nonetheless, in Stefanska v. Canada (.EL) 4 9 it was
specifically noted that the immigration officer was not required to dismedical information to the applicants before making
close the relevant
50
her decision.
This has at least two consequences relevant to the current discussion.
First, and more generally, it ensures that applicants will be entirely
alienated from the process to which they are being subjected. Second,
and more specifically, it greatly increases the chances that abuses such
as those in the Le and Bal cases will occur. Not only are the reasons
for admissibility withheld until disposition-reasons which in the Bal
case could have been rebutted-but with them also the policies which
may have been invoked at the expense of the merits of the case. The
conclusion that an individual's admission to Canada will cause
"excessive" demands on health and social services might be patently
unsustainable for reasons such as those in the Bal case (where no
diagnosis had in fact yet been made) or because the medical officers,
once having made a diagnosis, have not in fact turned their minds to
the question of demand at all. Disclosure of the "reasons" prior to disposition would allow applicants an opportunity to make submissions
as to why, in spite of the policy, discretion ought to be exercised in the
circumstances of their particular case. For example, in the applicants
diagnosed as having Down's Syndrome, an opportunity would be provided for the accumulation of evidence from teachers, doctors or
employers aimed at rebutting the presumption that such applicants
would probably cause excessive demands on health and social services.

48. Nicholson v. Haldimand-NorfoldPolice Commissioners Board, [1979] 1. S.C.R. 311,
78 C.LC.C. 14.
49. Stefanska v. Canada (M.E.I.), [19881 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) at 66 (F.C.T.D.).
50. The duty of the immigration (or visa) officer is to be "satisfied", pursuant to
s. 9(4) of the Act., that the person concerned is in fact a member of the inadmissible class described in s. 19.
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That such a requirement-mandated by the duty to be fair-would
reduce abuses generally within the medical assessment sphere is plain.
When one considers the number of times the Immigration Appeal
Board has overturned negative medical notifications for being based
on the possibility of demand being excessive, rather than on the probability5' of excessive demand, it is clear that many such abuses could
be prevented by more open administrative practice. A huge step in this
direction would be taken if the policies on which medical officers
act-as well as their duties-were required to be made more public
and an opportunity provided to those affected to make representations
in favour of an exception.
In the case of the Immigration Medical Activity, this would at the
least, require the following: firstly, that the policies upon which medical officers act should be made readily accessible to interested parties;
secondly, that there should be greater effort by Health and Welfare
and Employment and Immigration officials to develop guidelines
which explicitly recognize the fact of discretion and the need for close
examination of the merits of each case in relation to the criteria;
thirdly, that an interested party (made aware of the guidelines, the
diagnosis, and an explanation of how the policy has been related to
the particular case) should have an opportunity to make representations in favour of the discretion being used to produce an exception.
In this way, the interest of the individual applicant in having discretion brought to bear on his/her case can be protected while acknowledging the inevitability that "rules of thumb" will be adopted by
administrative agencies such as the Medical Services Branch.

51. Canada (M.EJ.) v Pattar (1988), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 79; Garcho v. Canada (M.E.I)
(1987), 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 92; Singh v. (M.E.I.) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) 240; Longive
v. Canada (M.EJ) (1987), 2 Imm. LR. 174; Esteban v. Canada (M.EJ.) (1987), 2
Imm. L. (2d) 184.

